AI control finder: which endpoint control fits your company?

Your answers point to on-device control

Products whose published facts match

Ordered by how many of your checks each product's own pages satisfy. Equal fits are listed alphabetically. This is a fit to your answers, not a quality ranking.

1. Equal fit · 2 products

   • Lasso Security

     Matches 3 of your checks fully, 2 partly, 0 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     Works with something you already run

     • On-device control Partly described

       Connects directly to Claude Code's lifecycle hooks via the enterprise management platform and inspects every tool call before it runs; a resident device agent is not described.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI coding assistants · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Browser extension Described

       AI usage control through a browser extension.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI usage control · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Claude Code lifecycle hooks, and MCP discovery across Claude, Cursor and Windsurf.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI coding assistants · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Inspects every Claude Code tool call before it is executed.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI coding assistants · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Matches

       Usage control through a browser extension.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI usage control · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Partly

       Claude Code hooks are set through the enterprise management platform; the other components are a browser extension, a proxy and a gateway.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI coding assistants · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Partly

       Alert is an action; asking the user is not described.

       Source: Lasso Security: MCP security · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Works with something you already run

       The usage control page says it works with CrowdStrike.

       Source: Lasso Security: AI usage control · Read 27 Sep 2026

   • Onyx Security

     Matches 3 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 1 not in our sources.

     Describes 2 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     Works with something you already run

     • On-device control Described

       Endpoint agents cover coding assistants and desktop AI agents.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Browser extension Described

       Browser extensions cover browser AI.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Partly

       Covers coding assistants; specific tools are not named on the pages we read.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Inspects every prompt, tool call and model response inline.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Matches

       Can mask data in browser AI as well as block it.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Matches

       Five actions: alert, block, mask, steer or ask.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Works with something you already run

       Lists CrowdStrike among its integrations.

       Source: Onyx Security: AI security platform · Read 27 Sep 2026

2. Equal fit · 2 products

   • CrowdStrike Falcon Guardian

     Matches 2 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     Built into a platform you already run

     • On-device control Described

       Discovers AI agents on supported endpoints and ties prompts, skills, tool calls, MCP servers and identity to what runs next; defines which agent types may run.

       Source: CrowdStrike blog: Falcon Guardian, 1 September 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Partly described

       (secondary: SACR) delivered also through browser extensions.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Names the coding agents it covers Partly

       Names Claude Code and Copilot Studio agents; Cursor, Codex and GitHub Copilot are not named on the pages we read.

       Source: CrowdStrike blog: Copilot Studio agents and Claude Code, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Checks and blocks Claude Code prompts and tool activity as they happen, and returns allow or block before a Copilot Studio agent runs a tool.

       Source: CrowdStrike blog: Copilot Studio agents and Claude Code, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Matches

       Through the Falcon sensor, if you run CrowdStrike Falcon.

       Source: CrowdStrike blog: Falcon Guardian, 1 September 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources
     • Built into a platform you already run

       Part of the CrowdStrike Falcon platform.

       Source: CrowdStrike: Falcon Guardian (formerly AIDR) · Read 13 Oct 2026

   • Harmonic Security

     Matches 4 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 0 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Partly described

       Deployment options include desktop apps and AI agents, rolled out through device management; the on-device component is not described in detail.

       Source: Harmonic Security pricing (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Described

       Browser extensions are a listed surface, with block, warn or log actions.

       Source: Harmonic Security homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       The Guide tier adds desktop AI apps and developer tools, naming Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT Desktop and Microsoft 365 Copilot.

       Source: Harmonic Security pricing (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       The Command tier adds MCP client and server discovery, agent permissions for read, write and execute, and MCP server tool controls.

       Source: Harmonic Security pricing (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Matches

       Block, warn or log on AI use in the browser.

       Source: Harmonic Security homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Matches

       Rolls out through Intune, JAMF, Kandji or Group Policy.

       Source: Harmonic Security homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Matches

       Warn is one of three actions, with block and log.

       Source: Harmonic Security homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

3. Equal fit · 3 products

   • Bay

     Matches 4 of your checks fully, 0 partly, 1 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Described

       Inventories AI agents, MCP servers, tools, credentials and extensions on the device, and its Enforcer returns Allow, Ask or Deny locally on prompts, pre-tool calls and post-tool responses on supported agent surfaces. Delivered as Wave, an ephemeral binary that runs through your existing MDM or EDR. Policies can be scoped by agent, group, endpoint or device.

       Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       No browser extension is described. Bay's Application Control can allow or block browsers and extensions as applications, which is a device rule, not a control on what goes into browser AI.

       Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Managed settings for Claude Code, Codex and Claude Desktop lock permission rules, preserve managed hooks, restrict MCP servers and constrain plugin sources.

       Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking, an AI agent attack (August 2026) · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Evaluates prompts, pre-tool calls and post-tool responses and returns Allow, Ask or Deny locally, which Bay states takes under 4ms with no cloud round-trip, on supported agent surfaces.

       Source: Bay blog: Ghostjacking (re-read) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Matches

       Deploys through your existing EDR or MDM; no new agents.

       Source: Bay homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Matches

       Ask is one of three answers, with Allow and Deny.

       Source: Bay homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

   • Ent

     Matches 2 of your checks fully, 2 partly, 1 not in our sources.

     Describes 2 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Described

       A single lightweight agent across Windows, macOS and Linux with one programmable policy for people and AI agents.

       Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Described

       Browser-extension deployments generally available at launch.

       Source: Ent press: $100M seed, 16 June 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Names OpenAI Codex, Claude Code, Claude Cowork, GitHub Copilot and Cursor.

       Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       Blocks risky agent behavior where needed; per-tool-call mechanics are not described.

       Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Partly

       Classifies sensitive data at the point of use on the device and in browsers; prompt-level controls are not detailed.

       Source: Ent press: intent-aware prevention for AI agents, 30 July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Matches

       Interventions range from a soft nudge to a hard block.

       Source: Ent homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026

   • Neo

     Matches 3 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 1 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Described

       A live inventory of agents, models, skills, MCP servers and extensions on every endpoint, with runtime control that intercepts agent actions.

       Source: Neo homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Partly described

       (secondary: SACR) user-mode endpoint and browser security.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Names Claude Code, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenAI Codex; Cursor is not named.

       Source: Neo: platform · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Intercepts agent actions at the endpoint and allows, blocks or holds them for approval.

       Source: Neo homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Partly

       Its own lightweight sensor rather than a rollout through existing EDR or MDM.

       Source: Neo: platform · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Matches

       Hold an action for verified human approval.

       Source: Neo: platform · Read 13 Oct 2026

4. • Prompt Security (SentinelOne)

     Matches 2 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 2 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Described

       A dedicated AI endpoint agent detects new AI agents, skills and connectors and applies runtime policies; it names GitHub Copilot, Cursor and Claude Code among the code assistants it inventories.

       Source: Prompt Security blog: browser and endpoint sensors · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Described

       A browser extension inspects prompts, redacts sensitive data and discovers shadow AI.

       Source: Prompt Security blog: browser and endpoint sensors · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Names GitHub Copilot, Cursor and Claude Code.

       Source: SentinelOne: Prompt Security · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Not in our sources
     • Controls what goes into browser AI Matches

       The browser extension inspects prompts and redacts sensitive data.

       Source: Prompt Security blog: browser and endpoint sensors · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Partly

       Its own agent and extension, managed in the SentinelOne console; it does not ride on other EDR or MDM tools.

       Source: Prompt Security blog: browser and endpoint sensors · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

5. Equal fit · 3 products

   • Akamai Workforce Protector

     Matches 2 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Partly described

       The page says its controls reach desktop applications; how that works on the device is not described on the page we read.

       Source: Akamai Workforce Protector (formerly LayerX) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Described

       A browser extension for Chrome, Edge, Firefox and Safari that controls prompts, responses, agent actions and data exchanges.

       Source: Akamai Workforce Protector (formerly LayerX) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Names the coding agents it covers Not in our sources
     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       Controls agent actions, including in agentic browsers; decisions on coding agent tool calls are not described.

       Source: Akamai Workforce Protector (formerly LayerX) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Matches

       Controls prompts and data exchanges, with warn, redact, block and guide.

       Source: Akamai Workforce Protector (formerly LayerX) · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Matches

       Warn and guide are actions alongside redact and block.

       Source: Akamai Workforce Protector (formerly LayerX) · Read 11 Oct 2026

   • Noma Security

     Matches 2 of your checks fully, 2 partly, 1 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Described

       Discovers endpoint agents such as Claude Code, Cursor and Codex with their MCP servers and skills, blocks unauthorized and malicious ones, and inspects activity at runtime.

       Source: Noma Security: endpoint agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Names Claude Code, Cursor and Codex.

       Source: Noma Security: endpoint agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       Runtime inspection of the event, the session, the identity behind the agent and the data it reaches; decisions on individual tool calls are described less specifically.

       Source: Noma Security: endpoint agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Matches

       Through your existing EDR or MDM, with no new endpoint agent.

       Source: Noma Security: endpoint agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Partly

       States that runtime decisions can route to a human.

       Source: Noma Security: endpoint agents (re-read) · Read 13 Oct 2026

   • Pluto Security

     Matches 0 of your checks fully, 3 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     Works with something you already run

     Works with something you already run

     • On-device control Partly described

       (secondary: SACR) inline hook configuration on coding agents for runtime observability and enforcement.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Partly

       Pluto's research covers Claude Code; SACR (secondary) says it governs tools such as ChatGPT, Claude and Copilot.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       (secondary: SACR) inline hooks on coding agents for runtime enforcement.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Partly

       (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources
     • Works with something you already run

       (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

     • Works with something you already run

       (secondary: SACR) deploys through existing CrowdStrike, Defender and MDM infrastructure.

       Source: SACR (secondary): CISO guide to endpoint control and prevention, July 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026 · secondary source

6. Equal fit · 2 products

   • Koi (Palo Alto Networks)

     Matches 1 of your checks fully, 2 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 1 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Described

       Agent-based visibility into models, MCPs and extensions, one-click removal of insecure packages, extensions and AI tools, and blocking of unsafe AI application interactions.

       Source: Palo Alto Networks: Cortex Agentic Endpoint Security · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       A Palo Alto Networks blog of 18 August 2026 names Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and Antigravity.

       Source: Palo Alto Networks blog: A Quarter of Innovation with Koi Agentic Endpoint Security · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       Blocks unsafe AI application interactions and prevents prompt injections; decisions on individual tool calls are not described.

       Source: Palo Alto Networks: Cortex Agentic Endpoint Security · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Partly

       A Cortex XDR module, or its own standalone agent.

       Source: Palo Alto Networks: Cortex Agentic Endpoint Security · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

   • Zenity

     Matches 2 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Partly described

       Blocks or modifies a dangerous tool call before it executes through native agent hooks; how it reaches endpoints is not detailed.

       Source: Zenity: coding and personal agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Matches

       Names Claude Code and Cowork, ChatGPT Codex, GitHub Copilot and Cursor.

       Source: Zenity: coding and personal agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Blocks or modifies a dangerous tool call before it executes.

       Source: Zenity: coding and personal agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Partly

       Can modify a tool call as well as block it; asking the user is not described.

       Source: Zenity: coding and personal agents · Read 27 Sep 2026

7. Equal fit · 2 products

   • Glow Security

     Matches 0 of your checks fully, 3 partly, 2 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Partly described

       Software control and runtime prevention policies; a pre-execution hook can block an action or hold it for approval.

       Source: Glow Security blog: AI agents exposed developer screenshots, 29 September 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Partly

       Names Claude Code through a managed-settings bundle in its Anthropic integration.

       Source: Glow Security: Anthropic integration · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       Describes a pre-execution hook that can block or hold an action.

       Source: Glow Security blog: AI agents exposed developer screenshots, 29 September 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Partly

       Can hold an action for approval.

       Source: Glow Security blog: AI agents exposed developer screenshots, 29 September 2026 · Read 13 Oct 2026

   • Sun Security

     Matches 1 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 3 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Partly described

       Covers agents on workstations; the on-device method is not described.

       Source: Sun Security homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Partly

       Names Cursor and Claude Cowork; Claude Code, Codex and GitHub Copilot are not named.

       Source: Sun Security homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Matches

       Every tool call, connection and resource draw is checked against the agent's purpose before it executes.

       Source: Sun Security homepage · Read 13 Oct 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

8. Equal fit · 2 products

   • Bloom Security

     Matches 0 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 4 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 1 partly.

     • On-device control Partly described

       Discovers software, extensions and AI on the endpoint and automatically scales back overpermissioned MCP servers; how it reaches the device is not published.

       Source: Bloom Security homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Not in our sources
     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Partly

       Automatically scales back overpermissioned MCP servers; decisions on individual calls are not described.

       Source: Bloom Security homepage · Read 27 Sep 2026

     • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

   • Zscaler Generative AI Security

     Matches 1 of your checks fully, 0 partly, 4 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Not in our sources
     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Not in our sources
     • Controls what goes into browser AI Matches

       Prompt-level visibility, DLP blocking across GenAI apps, and browser isolation that disables cut, paste and download.

       Source: Zscaler: Secure the use of generative AI · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

9. • AI Access Security (Palo Alto Networks)

     Matches 0 of your checks fully, 1 partly, 4 not in our sources.

     Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

     • On-device control Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Browser extension Not in our sources

       Not described on the pages we read.

     • Names the coding agents it covers Not in our sources
     • Decides on a tool call before it runs Not in our sources
     • Controls what goes into browser AI Partly

       Prevents sensitive data loss in GenAI apps; prompt-level controls are not detailed on the page.

       Source: Palo Alto Networks: AI Access Security · Read 11 Oct 2026

     • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
     • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

10. • Cloudflare AI Gateway

      Matches 0 of your checks fully, 0 partly, 5 not in our sources.

      Describes 0 of 2 picked control types, 0 partly.

      • On-device control Not in our sources

        Not described on the pages we read.

      • Browser extension Not in our sources

        Not described on the pages we read.

      • Names the coding agents it covers Not in our sources
      • Decides on a tool call before it runs Not in our sources
      • Controls what goes into browser AI Not in our sources
      • Rolls out through EDR or device management you run Not in our sources
      • Can warn or ask instead of only blocking Not in our sources

The rules above treat every product the same way and are published on How the finder works.